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Abstract
John Dewey proposes the “educative” experience as the goal of instruction. Yet, in 
focusing on the educative experience, Dewey may discount other sorts of learning 
which occur both in and out of school. Th is piece proposes a reconceptualization of 
Dewey's ideas on learning through Peirce's categorical system of experience, leading 
to three categories of learning. Th e three proposed categories, “accepting,” “analyti-
cal,” and “evaluative,” correspond roughly to learning “what,” learning “how,” and 
learning “why.” Th e intent here is not to question the importance of the educative 
experience, but rather to broaden the application of Dewey’s work by portraying 
learning as a multifaceted phenomenon.
Introduction 
In Experience and Education, John Dewey described how learning should occur in 
schools, and what the results of that learning should be. Critiquing both the tradi-
tional educational practices of his time and the progressive schools that took some 
of their ideas from his own work, Dewey put forth what he called the “educative” 
experience (LW 13: 11) as the aim of formal instruction. Th e educative experience 
is aff ectively engaging, intelligently directed, and disciplined by the demands of 
purposeful and social activity. It leads to growth in possibilities for perception 
and action. Dewey contrasted the educative experience to those experiences he la-
beled as “mis-educative” (LW 13: 11), which, lacking some or all of the features of 
the educative experience, actually close off  or limit such growth. He believed that 
the learning in schools both traditional and progressive was oft en mis-educative, a 
problem that could only be addressed if schools based their instruction on a “phi-
losophy of educative experience” (LW 13: 13). Dewey took on the task of laying out 
this philosophy, in the hopes that it would come to inform educational practice. 
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Unfortunately, Dewey’s dream of schooling based on a philosophy of experi-
ence has not been realized. Dewey’s ideas were infl uential, wide-ranging, and ahead 
of their time, but for all that they were, and still are, largely marginalized in both 
educational discourse and in the practices of schooling. As Lagemann (1989) puts 
it, “Edward L. Th orndike won and John Dewey lost” (p. 184). While Dewey’s “loss” 
can certainly be examined in light of the prevailing ideas and practices of educa-
tion in twentieth-century America (Berliner, 1993; Lagemann, 1989, 2000; Tom-
linson, 1997), or seen as related to his untimely departure from the University of 
Chicago and subsequent movement away from education (Lagemann, 2000), this 
piece puts forth the idea that Dewey’s ideas may have lacked traction because his 
defi nitions of experience, and of educative experiences in particular, leave out much 
of the learning that occurs in school, and indeed in life outside of school. Th ere is 
a gap between Dewey’s ideas on education and the practice thereof, and while this 
disconnect makes for a telling critique of schooling, it also makes for hard going 
for educators who are looking to teach as Dewey intended. 
Th is gap may be bridged, however, if Dewey’s ideas are seen through the lens 
of Charles S. Peirce’s account of experience. While Dewey focused his eff orts on 
describing experiences in their fullness or lack thereof, Peirce took a diff erent ap-
proach, attempting to describe the constituent parts of which any and all experi-
ences, or phenomena, consist (Gallie, 1966; Peirce, 1903/1997). Peirce’s approach 
thus led him to develop three categories of experience, categories that he consid-
ered to be fundamental, irreducible, and universal (Bernstein, 1971). In this piece, 
Peirce’s categorical account of experience is applied to Dewey’s various descriptions 
of learning to create a categorical system of learning. Th is system includes Dewey’s 
educative experience, but it also has room for experiences which, though they do 
not measure up to the standard of the educative, may still be regarded as learning. 
In re-articulating Dewey’s ideas on learning through Peirce’s categorical lens, 
the applicability of Dewey’s ideas to classrooms, places where learning occurs but 
where not all experiences are educative, may be enhanced. It should be mentioned, 
however, that this is not merely an attempt to adapt Dewey to classrooms as they 
are. Rather, in expanding Dewey’s ideas on learning, it is hoped that educators 
may be able to fi t a wider range of learning experiences into Dewey’s philosophi-
cal system. Educators may thus gain the power to better distinguish between those 
experiences which are educative and those which are not. Th ey may also be better 
able to shape their practices deliberately to produce the sorts of experiences, and 
learning results, that they choose. 
Experiences and Educative Experiences 
Dewey defi nes education, at least as it should be, as “intelligently directed develop-
ment of the possibilities of ordinary experience” (LW 13: 61), and claims that, in 
order to be such, it must be based on a “theory of experience” (LW 13: 17). Th us, 
Dewey’s ideas on learning begin with his ideas on experience, and are deeply con-
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nected to the other ideas that Dewey derived from his philosophy of experience, 
namely, those around intelligence, aesthetics, and even ethics. Each of these areas 
of Dewey’s thought will be drawn upon to fl esh out his account of learning and to 
emphasize its multifaceted nature. 
Starting with experience, it can be seen that “having an experience,” as Dewey 
put it, involves not merely doing something, but doing something with a certain 
awareness of what one is about. Th e sort of experience Dewey is describing when he 
speaks of “an experience” is distinguished from ordinary experience (LW10: 264; 
Wong & Pugh, 2001). A vital piece of that which distinguishes it is the perception 
of relationship between actions and consequences:
An experience has pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and 
undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in relationship. To put one’s 
hand in a fi re that consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. Th e 
action and its consequence must be joined in perception. Th is relationship 
is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence. Th e 
scope and content of the relations measure the signifi cant content of an 
experience. (LW 10: 50-51) 
Dewey’s characterization of “an experience” as a matter of “intelligence” 
further emphasizes the importance of the perception of means-ends relationships. 
When Dewey speaks of intelligence, he means not an innate ability, but rather a cer-
tain open disposition toward action, one informed by an understanding of what one 
is doing and why one is doing it (Bernstein, 1966). As Dewey puts it, “the formation 
of purposes and the organization of means to execute them are the work of intel-
ligence” (LW 13: 42). In essence, then, “having an experience” involves intelligent 
activity, which means a person is not merely doing something, but in fact doing 
something with a full awareness of ends and means, of purposes and consequences. 
Wherever one looks in Dewey’s work, the relationship between purposes and 
consequences, or means and ends, or actions and outcomes, is the stuff  of Dew-
eyan experience, or at least of experiences of a more desirable sort. Perception of 
the relationship between action and consequence is also manifest, for example, in 
Dewey’s defi nition of aesthetic activity:  
Esthetic eff ects belong intrinsically to their medium . . . Th e diff erence be-
tween external and intrinsic operations runs through all the aff airs of life. 
One student studies to pass an examination, to get promotion. To another, 
the means, the activity of learning, is completely one with what results from 
it. Th e consequence, instruction, illumination, is one with the process . . . 
Means and ends coalesce. If we run over in mind a number of such cases 
we quickly see that all the cases in which means and ends are external to 
one another are non-aesthetic. Th is externality may even be regarded as 
the defi nition of the non-esthetic. (LW 10: 201-202) 
Th is sort of active awareness also appears in Dewey’s discussions of what he 
hoped to see in school settings. Dewey did not believe that students were not having 
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experiences in school. Rather, he believed that they were not having the right sort 
of experiences. Th e sort of experiences he wanted for students were, perhaps unsur-
prisingly, ones in which they would gain an appreciation for the sorts of means-ends 
relationships that characterize experience, intelligence, and aesthetics: “Th e trouble 
with education is not the absence of situations in which the causal relation is exem-
plifi ed in the relation of means and consequences. Failure to utilize the situations 
so as to lead the learner on to grasp the relation in the given cases of experience 
is, however, all too common” (LW 13: 56). Dewey distinguishes between the right 
and wrong sorts of experiences in schools by labeling them as either “educative” or 
“mis-educative” (LW 13: 11), with the former being his ideal. 
In Experience and Education, Dewey lays out the characteristics of educative 
experiences according to two principles. Th e fi rst, the principle of interaction, states 
that experiences must consist of a transaction between person and environment, 
or between internal and objective conditions. Th e second, the principle of conti-
nuity, operates along with the principle of interaction and states that the quality 
of any experience determines the quality of subsequent experiences. Both of these 
principles can themselves be framed in terms of the active perception of means-
ends connections.
Th e principle of interaction demands that educative experiences involve 
both the person and the environment, that is, that people have the opportunity to 
bring their framing of purposes to activity, and that they encounter the environ-
ment such that they may manipulate means in order to reach their chosen ends. 
Too much focus on either the external or the internal prevents the exercise of in-
telligent activity.  Th e imposition of the external can lead to objective conditions 
taking precedence to the exclusion of internal drives or intrinsic interests, while 
an excessive focus on internal or individual states can prevent a full encounter 
with the objective conditions of experience. Put another way, neither internally-
derived ends, nor objectively present means, can dominate an educative experi-
ence. Both must be a part of it. 
As with the principle of interaction, the principle of continuity also relates to 
the perception of means-ends relationships in activity. Th e educative experience, 
immediately alive with the interaction of person and world, then leads to growth 
in one’s ability to have such interactions. Th e question is not whether an experience 
has continuity, that is, whether it aff ects subsequent experiences, but rather whether 
those eff ects limit growth and development or enhance them (LW 13: 20-21). When 
one perceives and acts upon means-ends relationships in present experience, their 
perception grows, allowing a fuller appreciation of such relationships in future ex-
periences. Th e fullness of experience, measured in terms of the present and the fu-
ture, is thus the judge of whether an experience is educative or mis-educative, and 
the fullness of experience is only reached through an active attempt to derive pur-
poses or ends, to shape means towards those ends, and to assess the consequences 
of activity against the test of original purposes. 
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“Other” Types of Learning: Mis-educative Experiences 
So goes the educative experience, but a full accounting of Dewey’s ideas on learn-
ing also includes those experiences which are not educative, or are mis-educative. 
Dewey supplies descriptions of mis-educative experiences as counter-examples to 
those which he considers to be educative. One such counter-example describes the 
cooking of an egg:
For the child simply to desire to cook an egg, and accordingly drop it in 
water for three minutes, and take it out when he is told, is not educative. 
But for the child to realize his own impulse by recognizing the facts, ma-
terials, and conditions involved, and then to regulate his impulse through 
that recognition, is educative. Th is is the diff erence, upon which I wish to 
insist, between exciting or indulging an interest and realizing it through 
its direction. (MW 1: 27)
In using this particular example, Dewey is making a distinction between 
knowledge of an activity and understanding of that activity, only the latter being 
associated with the educative. Dewey draws a similar contrast between these types 
of knowing when he describes the diff erence between knowing about a car and 
knowing how it works: 
Th e distinction between knowledge, information, and understanding is 
not a complicated or philosophical matter. An individual may know all 
about the structure of an automobile, may be able to name all the parts of 
the machine and tell what they are there for. But he does not understand 
the machine unless he knows how it works and how to work it; and, if it 
doesn’t work right, what to do in order to make it work right. You can carry 
that simple illustration through any fi eld that you please. (LW 11: 184)
Elsewhere, he makes a similar claim when he describes how the learning of certain 
knowledge is not necessarily a matter of learning to use that knowledge intelligently: 
Knowledge about things is static. Th ere is no guarantee in any amount 
of information, even if skillfully conveyed, that an intelligent attitude of 
mind will be formed . . . I do not mean to say that we can have understand-
ing without knowledge, without information; but I do mean that there is 
no guarantee, as I have just said, that the acquisition and accumulation of 
knowledge will create the attitudes that generate intelligent action. (LW 
11: 183-84)  
Putting all of this together, along with previously described connections be-
tween intelligent activity and the educative experience, it can be seen that the mere 
learning of facts and skills, of ideas and procedures, is not educative unless it is ac-
companied by understanding. Such understanding allows students to act intelli-
gently in the present and in the future. In other words, such understanding consists 
of knowledge of the relationships between means and ends. Clearly, mis-educative 
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experiences do not involve students making the sort of means-ends connections 
that characterize educative experiences, and so we come to one way of character-
izing mis-educative experiences: as learning without understanding. 
Still, there is more to Dewey’s descriptions of the mis-educative. For even 
learning that is accompanied by understanding may not, in the end, measure up to 
Dewey’s ideal if the understanding is not of the right sort. Specifi cally, this second 
type of mis-educative learning includes an awareness of ends and means, but leaves 
out wider consideration of the purposes and consequences of activity. In fl eshing out 
this second sort of mis-educative learning, it is useful to look at Dewey’s description 
of the necessity, not only of growth in learning, as the principle of continuity de-
mands, but of directed growth. In distinguishing between the two, Dewey provides 
an example of learning to be a burglar, or an unsavory character of a similar sort: 
a man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that 
direction, and by practice may grow into a highly skilled expert burglar. 
Hence it is argued here that “growth” is not enough; we must also specify 
the direction in which growth takes place, the end towards which it tends 
. . . Th at a man may grow in effi  ciency as a burglar, as a gangster, or as a 
corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth 
as education and education as growth the question is whether growth in 
this direction promotes or retards growth in general . . . when and only 
when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does 
it answer to the criterion of education as growing. (LW 13: 19-20) 
If growth itself does not suffi  ce to distinguish an educative experience, this 
means that even learning experiences that do forge links between means and ends, 
and that result in abilities to apply knowledge and exercise skill and judgment, are 
not necessarily educative. Learning, then, cannot simply be separated into learn-
ing with understanding (the educative) and learning without understanding (the 
mis-educative). A further distinction in required, as learning with understanding 
can result either in properly directed growth or in misdirected growth. 
Th e distinguishing mark between properly directed and misdirected growth 
seems to be a matter, as experience itself is, of awareness. Learning can be mis-ed-
ucative, not because of a lack of awareness of means and ends, but instead because 
of an awareness that is too narrow.  Growth is a matter of ever expanding abilities 
in the realms of perception and action, and is further connected to a greater con-
nection to life, the world, and one’s fellow humans, which not only makes growth 
the desired end in education, but even imbues it with moral value (MW 4: 213). A 
career in burglary, in directing growth narrowly, lacks the moral value of these con-
nections. As Dewey says, when defi ning moral activity: “All conscious human life 
is concerned with ends, and with selecting, arranging, and employing the means, 
intellectual, emotional, and practical, involved in these ends. Th is makes conduct. 
But it does not follow that all conduct has moral import” (MW 8: 190, italics in 
original). Th e diff erence between moral and non-moral activity comes down, not 
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to a failure to make means-ends connections, but rather to just which means and 
ends are being considered. According to Dewey, there are
two diff ering ways in which activity is induced and guided by ideas of valu-
able results. In one case the end presents itself directly as desirable, and 
the question is only as to the steps or means of achieving this end. Here 
we have conduct which, although excited and direct by considerations of 
value, is still morally indiff erent. Such is the condition of things whenever 
one end is taken for granted by itself without any consideration of its relation 
to other ends. It is then a technical rather than a moral aff air. (MW 8: 191)
Th is distinction between learning with understanding that is educative, and 
that which is not, may be further clarifi ed by borrowing from Dewey’s ideas on 
the aesthetic. As with the educative versus the mis-educative, where even learning 
that leads to skill and understanding is not necessarily educative, so it is that, in the 
matter of aesthetics, even great skill does not necessarily make one an artist. When, 
for example, Dewey writes about the need for teachers to be artists, he says that 
if education is going to live up to its profession, it must be seen as a work of 
art which requires the same qualities of personal enthusiasm and imagi-
nation as are required by the musician, painter or artist. Each one of these 
artists needs a technique which is more or less mechanical, but in the de-
gree to which he loses he personal vision to become subordinate to the 
more formal rules of the technique he falls below the level and grade of 
the artist. He becomes reduced again to the level of the artisan who fol-
lows the blue prints, drawings, and plans that are made by other people.  
(MW 15: 186-187)
As can be seen here, Dewey separates skillful activity in and of itself, or ex-
ecuted according to external directives, from skillful activity undertaken under 
the direction of “personal vision.” Another interpretation of this separation, con-
nected to the above distinction between moral and technical aff airs, can be seen 
when Dewey writes about the diff erence between an artist and a technician: “the 
diff erence between the artist and the mere technician is unmistakable. Th e artist 
is a masterful technician. Th e technique or mechanism is fused with thought and 
feeling. Th e ‘mechanical’ performer permits the mechanism to dictate the perfor-
mance” (MW 14: 51). 
As in the fi rst example, the diff erence between artist and technician is not 
phrased in terms of skills. Art has its technical aspect, and skill is necessary, but 
skill alone does not make for art. Th e artist and the technician are doing diff erent 
work, and this is so because of the sort of awareness each brings to activity. Cer-
tainly, skilled technicians have an awareness of means and ends, else they would 
not be able to carry out their activities with knowledge of what they are aiming to 
accomplish. And yet, the means-ends awareness of the technician is limited to the 
activity at hand, dictated by “the mechanism,” by the technical requirements of 
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the task, with other purposes and consequences left  out of consideration. In other 
words, while a technician may operate with great skill, and may indeed exercise 
judgment and make links between means and ends, these judgments are bounded. 
Th ey do not go beyond the activity. Artistry demands a sort of judgment that goes 
beyond even means and ends, and which might be phrased more accurately as a 
consideration of purposes and consequences. 
Th is then brings us back to the matter of the educative and the mis-educa-
tive. As with the diff erence between moral and technical guidance in activity, and 
between artist and craft sman, the diff erence between the right sort of growth and 
the sort that is characterized by increasingly profi cient burglary comes down to the 
awareness one brings to the activity being carried out. In both examples, Dewey 
describes an exercise of skill without attention to larger questions, and this sort of 
means-ends awareness in relation to skillful practice is insuffi  cient to reach the level 
of the moral, the aesthetic, or the educative. One must not only act with skill, but 
must ask, essentially, “why” one is engaging in activity, rather than either not asking 
the question (as in the case of the burglar) or letting mechanism or external forces 
answer it (as in the case of the technician). Th is point can also be described in terms 
used by Field and Latta (2001), who, in a Deweyan take on teacher education, claim 
that profi ciency is not the same as wisdom. However the distinction is described, 
it can be seen that the awareness of means-ends relationships, while necessary for 
the full nature of the educative experience, is not suffi  cient to it. 
Overall, then, experiences which fall outside of the defi nition of the educative 
experience can be divided roughly into two types, or two ways of learning. Th e fi rst 
of these is learning to do something, but without an understanding of the process, 
the means and ends, by which something works. Th e product of such learning is 
an infl exible approach to skills and knowledge. In the second sort of learning, a 
student may indeed engage in fi guring out the ends and means of activity, and may 
end up with an extensive understanding that leads to skill in execution, yet still have 
an experience that stops short of the educative. Th is second sort of mis-educative 
learning comes about when a student’s understanding is bounded by the activity 
itself, and does not touch upon the wider purposes and consequences, the aesthetic 
or moral issues, surrounding the activity. 
Turning to Peirce’s Categories of Experience 
Having laid out the two varieties of mis-educative experiences that Dewey de-
scribes, one can add the educative experience to the mix, making a total of three 
types of experiences that defi ne the workings of learning. Utilizing a set of terms 
that Dewey employs to describe the various features of activity in general (LW 16: 
337-340), and focusing on the activity of learning in particular, these types of expe-
riences can be described as learning “what” to do, learning “how” to do something, 
and learning “why” (or, as Dewey also puts it, “what for”) to do something. Th ese 
three descriptions correspond, respectively, to learning without understanding, 
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learning with understanding in a narrow or technical sense, and learning with 
understanding in the broadest moral or aesthetic sense, this last corresponding to 
the educative experience.
Once learning experiences are divided up into these three types, the gap be-
tween the educative experience and everyday learning experiences becomes clear. 
Learning “what” to do oft en proceeds without understanding, as anyone who has 
memorized their multiplication tables can confi rm, and it is realistic to believe that 
a great many eggs are cooked, every day, without a grasp of the larger relations be-
hind the activity. As to the distinction between learning “how” and learning “why,” 
between technical and moral or aesthetic activity, students oft en demonstrate great 
skill in school without asking “why” questions or bringing their creative capacities 
to bear, the purposes and shape of the work being supplied by grades, teacher direc-
tives, and pre-determined measures of performance. Th is carries over out of school 
as well, as skillful performance in any fi eld does not necessarily imply that purposes 
and consequences, outside of the immediate and technical demands of the tasks 
in question, are opened up to examination in either an aesthetic or a moral sense. 
If such common learning experiences fall outside of the realm of the educative, 
then Dewey’s educative experience can seem quite disconnected from classroom 
learning. It might be argued that this disconnect is the point of Dewey’s critique of 
schooling, and less a problem than a call for change, but this is not a particularly 
helpful answer to teachers who are aiming to follow Dewey’s path in schools today. 
Since such teachers can only be said to be teaching according to Dewey’s philoso-
phy when their lessons achieve the educative, they end up spending the rest of their 
instructional time wandering somewhere off  the philosophical map. Teachers can 
respond to this haphazard guidance in a number of ways, none of them satisfactory. 
Th ey might abandon the idea of teaching as Dewey intended, seeing it as too re-
moved from “real” classrooms. Th ey might water down Dewey’s ideas to something 
more manageable on an everyday level, throwing an occasional student-centered 
activity into the daily routine. Or they might doggedly attempt to reach the educa-
tive at all times, probing at the aesthetic and moral aspects of times tables and egg 
cooking and such, this eff ort likely leading to failure as well as to a neglect of the 
“what” and “how” aspects of subject matter. 
What is needed, then, is a new system for describing learning experiences, one 
which maintains Dewey’s insights on learning while bridging the gap between edu-
cative experiences and other everyday learning experiences. Th is is where Charles 
S. Peirce is brought into the picture. Like Dewey, Peirce made a determined attempt 
to understand “experience,” but where Dewey laid out the concept of “an experi-
ence” and situated all experiences according to their closeness to or distance from 
this ideal, Peirce took experience and divided it up into its constituent parts. He 
in fact proposed a triadic conception of experience, claiming that all of experience 
was made up of three universal categories. If Dewey’s three types of learning, one 
educative and two mis-educative, could be fi t into Peirce’s categorical conception 
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of experience, the result would be a philosophical system that remains rooted in 
Dewey’s work yet also acknowledges and legitimizes learning in its several forms, 
providing teachers with guidance that covers all the learning that happens in class-
rooms, not only educative experiences. 
If Dewey’s types of learning experiences are indeed to be seen through the 
lens of Peirce’s categories of experience, it is necessary to fi rst explore those cat-
egories so as to ascertain what Peirce was getting at and how his system might 
be applied to Dewey’s. Peirce wished to dig down to the roots of experience so as 
to ascertain the parts of which any and all experiences are made. He determined 
that all experience could be divided into three categories, which he called fi rst-
ness, secondness, and thirdness. Peirce described his three categories in this way: 
“Th e fi rst is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor ly-
ing behind anything. Th e second is that which is what it is by force of something 
to which it is second. Th e third is that which is what it is owing to things between 
which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other” (qtd. in Cor-
rington, 1993, p. 125). In a similar formulation, Peirce notes: “First is the concep-
tion of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception 
of being relative to, the conception of reaction with something else. Th ird is the 
conception of mediation, whereby a fi rst and second are brought into relation” 
(qtd. in Gallie, 1966, pp. 182-183).
Some additional exploration reveals other features of the three categories. 
Describing fi rstness, Bernstein (1971) also refers to its “immediate quality,” but 
brings, too, the sense of “unattached possibility” that also comes with it (p. 180). 
Corrington (1993) adds a list of attributes of fi rstness, including “freshness, pres-
entness, immediacy, newness, originality, spontaneity, freedom, having no unity, 
having no parts, feeling, and pure quality” (p. 126). Firstness may be described 
as feeling itself, but not a feeling, per se, because a feeling requires comparison 
that fi rstness, a quality that is not intellectualized, does not (Peirce, 1903/1997). 
Th e main point to come out of this, for the purposes of this piece, is that fi rst-
ness is a piece of experience that is not intellectualized, compared, or explored. 
It merely is. 
While fi rstness is associated with a monad, secondness is by contrast a dyad, 
where two elements are distinguished and mutually defi ning. Th is can be charac-
terized, for example, in the relationship between self-other, or between eff ort and 
resistance (Bernstein, 1971, p. 180). Secondness is “brute existence, duality, oppo-
sition, and confl ict” (Corrington, 1993, p. 100), and its attributes include “compul-
sion, eff ect, eff ort, independence, result, negation, relation, and occurrence” (p. 127). 
Knight (1965) relates that “[e]pistemologically it is an idea of fact, struggle, resistance, 
power, volition, or eff ort, to name a few of Peirce’s synonyms for it. It is realized in 
the psychological states of shock, surprise, action, and perception. Metaphysically, 
it is characterized as otherness, the non-ego” (p. 77). While fi rstness represents 
possibility unrealized, secondness represents realization and reaction, of pushing 
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and pushing-back, of “otherness and opposition” (Spinks, 1991, p. 32). Secondness 
thus has a dualistic nature, a sense of pushing back and forth between person and 
world. Unlike fi rstness, secondness is a matter of awareness.
Going beyond and bringing together the monad of fi rstness, and the dyad 
of secondness, thirdness is the triadic relationship. Of thirdness, Bernstein (1971) 
says: “Th e fi nal category, Th irdness, is at once the most intriguing and diffi  cult to 
understand. Habits, laws, rules, potentiality, intentions, concepts, signs, meaning, 
and conduct are all classifi ed as Th irds” (p. 182). Peirce’s own example of third-
ness is where A gives B to C, where the idea of giving, which is a matter of intent 
and cannot be reduced to a mere action that transfers B from A to C, represents 
a third (Bernstein, 1971, p. 182). Th e triadic relationship, then, is characterized 
by intent, and by laws that give meaning to actions done with intent. Corrington 
links this emphasis on intent and lawfulness to morality, stating that, “Th e move 
from mere behavior to self-controlled conduct is a move possible only because of 
the power of thirdness . . . In describing thirdness, [Peirce] at the same time gives 
it a strong moral cast” (1993, p. 135).
Th irdness, in a sense, combines aspects of fi rstness and secondness. First-
ness is possibility, secondness specifi c action, and thirdness is general action. As 
a general, it goes beyond the specifi cs of secondness, but as an action, thirdness 
transcends the mere possibility of fi rstness. Th e link that brings possibility and 
action together is purpose, the intention to do something, and circumstances or 
lawfulness that gives that something an identity. Th irdness is not closed off , since 
what one will do in any given situation is not contained by all that has been done 
before, yet neither is thirdness entirely unspecifi ed, since it is governed by intention 
and by the situation at hand (Corrington, 1993). Essential in all this is the relation 
of thirdness to purpose, meaning, and morality. If fi rstness is unconsidered, and 
secondness is considered in an immediate sense, then thirdness is considered in 
a wider sense, one which involves past and future, as well as intent and purpose. 
With purpose, and the addition of what has been and what will be, meaning comes 
in. And with meaning, with thought of what is to happen, comes the ability to ask 
how consequences fi t with intent.
An example may shed further light on the nature of the categories. Taking 
the categories in terms of the self, fi rstness corresponds to feeling, secondness to 
experience, which forces one to think, and thirdness to thought for the future, for 
the possible consequences of what one does (Corrington, 1993, pp. 99-100). Th e place 
of monad, dyad, and triad are clear here: the monad is feeling unintellectualized, 
the dyad a matter of confronting something, of resistance that forces thinking and 
eff ort that characterizes it, and the triad a matter of intention and situation, where 
meaning is determined by what is happening and what is intended to happen, the 
link between action and consequence determined by a third realm and not merely 
by a dyadic push-back. 
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The Categories of Learning 
Having examined Peirce’s triadic conception of experience, the next step is to ap-
ply the universal categories of experience to the types of learning experiences that 
exist in Dewey’s system. Overlaid onto Dewey’s various descriptions of the pro-
cesses and results of learning, Peirce’s categories can indeed produce a system that 
encompasses all the types of learning described above. Th e unconsidered nature of 
fi rstness corresponds to cooking the egg, to doing without understanding, to learn-
ing “what” to do. Th e dyadic nature of secondness, with its idea of awareness and 
push between person and world, corresponds to the more analytical nature of doing 
with understanding, yet without evaluative and moral judgment of the educative 
experience. It is learning “how” something works, without consideration of “why” 
questions. Th irdness, with its fl avor of intent and purpose, and moral cast, corre-
sponds with the educative experience, with wider judgments around purposes and 
consequences being made, judgments that come from asking “why” or “what for.” 
Another way of labeling the three types of learning, suggested by the processes and 
products associated with each, is to refer to fi rstness, secondness, and thirdness in 
learning as “accepting” learning, “analytical” learning, and “evaluative” learning, 
respectively. Th ese labels will be used here to refer to, and to distinguish between, 
the categories at they refer specifi cally to learning. 
Each of these categories of learning—accepting, analytical, and evaluative—can 
be further described by looking, in Deweyan fashion, at both product and process. 
Accepting learning, or learning “what,” resembles the original activity in appear-
ance and may manifest itself as imitation, parroting, or following directions without 
thought to the meaning behind the directions. Th e sense of possibility inherent in the 
general category of fi rstness, the pure, fresh, unanalyzed quality, comes through in 
this application to learning via the unintellectualized nature of imitation. One does, 
without “thinking” about it, what one is told or shown, as with Dewey’s egg-cooking 
example. Th e product of accepting learning is likely to be knowledge that is inap-
plicable outside of the very narrow context in which is has been learned. While such 
knowledge may undoubtedly be useful, it is still akin to “rote” or “inert” knowledge. 
Analytical learning, or learning “how,” would go beyond following directions 
or imitation, and would look toward the workings of the activity, an understanding 
of how what is being done relates to the steps and goals of the activity. Put another 
way, it is a matter of function, as opposed to accepting learning, which is a mat-
ter of form. Th is manifestation of secondness describes a causal or analytical sort 
of learning, where the learned act resembles the original through comparison of 
similarities and diff erences in execution. Analytical learning is thus distinguished 
from accepting learning by intellectualization, and by the dualistic struggle entailed 
in fi guring out, not just what one is doing, but also the reasons for one’s actions, 
through a test of action against world. 
Th e results of learning “how” are thus more broadly applicable than those 
of learning “what,” and analytical learning equips a person to act, not merely with 
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skill, but with fl exibility, the power to modify or exceed the original procedure. 
Also, while accepting learning can be accomplished through repetition, analytical 
learning requires some thought, and is associated with activity that is not merely 
repetitive but also refl ective. Th is is the realm of analysis, and thus the realm of 
competence, even craft smanship. Still, as with the activities of Dewey’s technician, 
the understanding resulting from analytical learning is bounded by the activity, 
or the “mechanism.”
Evaluative learning, learning “why,” or the educative experience, is distin-
guished from the other two levels by its going beyond imitation in form or under-
standing of function. Th e character of this thirdness is imparted, not by outward 
resemblance or functional similarity, but by intention and consequence, purpose 
and circumstance, past occurrences and future plans. Th e relational or mediative 
aspect of thirdness comes through as the “what” is being done is combined with 
the “how” in the examination of consequences. If fi rstness relates to doing, and 
secondness to understanding, then thirdness relates to meaning. Th us, evaluative 
learning is the study of a subject, skill, or idea from a standpoint which includes 
consideration of purpose, intention, situation, and consequence. Th ese consider-
ations, this work in the realm of meaning, link the educative to the aesthetic. An-
other way to view this category, echoing Corrington’s (1993) description of third-
ness in general, is that the educative in learning works upon the moral level, and 
that this is what distinguishes learning “why” or “what for” from learning “what” 
or learning “how.” Th e outcome of such learning is the widest of awareness, that 
which reaches the level of meaningful activity, and which equips the learner with 
understanding that can be applied to continued growth through future experi-
ences of the same sort. 
Conclusion: Application of the Categories of Learning 
Th is categorical system, built from Dewey’s descriptions of educative and mis-
educative experiences and Peirce’s categorical classifi cation of all experiences, is in 
its present form far from fully developed. A more complete picture of each of the 
categories remains to be worked out. Further consideration of the work of Dewey 
and Peirce is needed to reveal additional connections and to fi nd potential areas 
of incompatibility. Relationships between these categories and other theories of 
learning, particularly those which have arisen in educational psychology since the 
days of Dewey and Peirce, can and should be explored. And the categories them-
selves need additional defi nition, as it remains to be determined whether the cat-
egories should be viewed as aspects of all learning experiences or as separate types 
of learning experiences. 
Interesting though they may be, these issues must remain unexplored here, 
not only because of considerations of space, but also because the categories of learn-
ing have some practical applications to which due attention should be given. Th e 
idea of dividing Deweyan learning experiences into Peircian categories was, aft er 
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all, born out of the gap that exists between Dewey’s educative experience and the 
everyday learning experiences that occur in schools as well as outside of them. Th e 
categories of learning laid out here are meant to close that gap, and may thus have 
the potential to change the work of those teachers who would teach in a Deweyan 
manner. Some ideas about the direction such changes might take are explored be-
low, along with a few additional applications of the categories which, though they 
do not make for a defi nitive list of potential uses, at least hint at what might be done 
with this alternative perspective on learning and experience. 
Th is categorical framework’s appeal for teachers comes from its combina-
tion of Dewey’s insights on experience with an acknowledgement of the existence 
and legitimacy of all three of the types of learning. Th is inclusiveness means that 
teachers employing this framework could keep Dewey as their guide even when 
they teach lessons that do not measure up to the educative. Th e gap between the 
educative and other types of learning is thus closed. And yet, the educative it-
self is not left  out. It is, in the form of evaluative learning, an integral part of this 
categorical system, meaning that teachers who would use such a system, even as 
they are relieved of the burden of reaching the educative at all times, would still 
be faced with the necessity of getting their students there eventually. Th is is the 
other side of the statement that Dewey’s educative experience is not common 
in everyday learning, and particularly in schools. Th e categories of learning ac-
knowledge this, but they can also be used to change it. And by enabling teach-
ers to think philosophically about their lessons no matter what type of learning 
they represent, these categories can make this change happen in a way that helps 
teachers to move closer to Dewey’s ideal of teaching carried out according to a 
philosophy of experience.
If it is accepted that the variety of learning experiences found in classrooms 
can be brought under the umbrella of the categories of learning, and these catego-
ries can also be employed to see that all aspects of learning are addressed, there still 
remains the question of just how the use of these categories might shape teaching 
practices. Several possibilities immediately suggest themselves. Th ese categories 
could be incorporated into teachers’ planning processes, and learning goals and 
objectives could be written to include, not only the content to be addressed, or 
the behaviors expected, but also the types of learning intended. Rote learning of 
names and dates or basic terms, or the repetitive practice of basic procedures, may 
be necessary preliminary steps in a teacher’s larger plan, and practices appropriate 
to accepting learning may be employed to carry out these steps. Analytical lessons 
in which students employ processes refl ectively, work problems, gain experience 
with equipment, or apply theories across settings can be pursued in a similar fash-
ion, put into lessons as necessary but not entirely suffi  cient steps toward an overall 
learning experience. Along with all this, “why” questions can also be addressed at 
various times, employed in designing anticipatory or culminating experiences, in-
corporated into applications that go beyond the technical and into the creative, or 
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used to start students down paths that even the teacher may not have yet explored. 
Such an approach could lead to substantial diff erences in lesson planning, and im-
plementation, even as it encompasses familiar sorts of learning experiences. One 
can imagine a family at the dinner table, and the parents asking their children not 
only “what did you learn at school today?” but also “what type of learning did you 
do at school today?”
Leaving the world of teaching, possible uses for this framework can be 
imagined for educational researchers as well. In studying learning from this ex-
periential and categorical perspective, questions could be asked not only about 
whether students are learning the subject matter, and how deep or fl exible that 
learning might be, but also about the students’ purposes for learning and the re-
lation between those purposes and the ends to which learning may eventually 
be put. Accepting learning may be useful, but its unconsidered and potentially 
infl exible nature may result in inert knowledge. Analytical learning may lead to 
great skill and understanding, but may lead to action that is, to use a formulation 
employed by Field and Latta (2001), competent but not wise. Th e educative expe-
rience involves judgment and the self, but it seems that this sort of learning may 
indeed be the rarest, and so researchers’ task may be to search it out, or to ask 
where it is occurring. In any case, classroom learning could be examined in terms 
of its means and ends and according to the three categories, with attention given 
to how students are experiencing, and being prepared to employ, subject matter 
both inside and outside of the classroom.
Such work may also lead to a more general application of the three categories 
of learning, namely, consideration of the purposes and consequences of the sorts of 
learning theories that are applied to education. Broadly, learning theory can be di-
vided into behaviorist, cognitive, and situative strands (Greeno, Collins, & Resnick, 
1996), and each of these brings to schools certain practices. Schooling can be seen 
as being conducted with a mix of these theories in mind, though the behaviorist, 
and to a lesser extent the cognitive, are dominant modes (Berliner, 1993; Brown, 
1994; Lagemann, 1989; Resnick, 1984; Tomlinson, 1997). Bringing Dewey’s ideas, in 
the form of the categories of learning, to bear on these theories opens up questions 
around the practices supported by each, and of the consequences, for students, of 
employing such practices. Much of the form of school practice has been determined 
by tradition and by a narrow conception of what “works,” that is, what is eff ective in 
maintaining the system of schooling as-is and producing a particular, and limited, 
set of outcomes. Asking what schooling produces in terms of students’ abilities to 
perceive and act in the world shift s the conversation, bringing in a more full and 
meaningful range of the possible outcomes of learning. 
Th is framework might also be employed to ask such questions from an even 
wider perspective, getting at the relationship between school and society that was 
so important to Dewey. In the realm of policy, national education reform eff orts 
such as No Child Left  Behind, or the Obama administration’s more recent Race to 
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the Top initiative, could be examined from the perspective of what types of learning 
they are demanding, supporting, or promoting in schools. While much attention 
has been given to accountability, to the idea that all children can learn and that 
schools must be taken to task if learning is not occurring, little attention has been 
given to just what is meant by “learning.” Because learning is left  undefi ned, or is 
defi ned merely by achievement on standardized tests, the debate about whether 
these policy initiatives are appropriate or eff ective focuses on other realms, such 
as funding, sanctions, merit pay, or Federal versus state prerogatives. Looking at 
such policy decisions through the lens of the categories of learning brings the types 
of learning that are occurring to the forefront, going beyond even asking whether 
tests can measure learning to asking what types of learning are produced by the 
school practices promoted by the policies in question. Critiques of such reforms 
might thus be guided by considerations of “why” questions as well as “what” and 
“how” questions, and by attention to the ways that people, and citizens, are shaped 
by the learning experiences they have in the public schools. Th e debate could then 
encompass not only learning, but also personal development, and not only personal 
development, but also the preparation of an educated citizenry for participation in 
a democratic system of governance. Surely, if Dewey were alive today, he would be 
asking such questions of our educational policies, pushing us to strive for a version 
of political pragmatism that goes beyond bipartisanship or a focus on results, one 
that harkens back to his own interpretation of the term as based the consideration 
of, and the search for, meaning. 
Stepping back even further, it can be seen that all of these possible applica-
tions, in the end, are related to the results, for society, of learning along accepting, 
analytical, or evaluative lines. It is proposed here, following Dewey’s lead, that edu-
cative experiences are necessary to prepare the sorts of citizens and workers that 
a modern democratic society needs. If accepting learning is a primary emphasis, 
the infl exible and hard to apply knowledge that results, along with the necessity 
or being told what to do, will make for poor workers and poor citizens, lacking in 
initiative and in the ability to engage in meaningful political activity. If analytical 
learning represents a main emphasis, those who are gaining great skill in school 
might make better workers and more informed citizens, but might not be gaining 
a corresponding ability to take a broad view of the purposes and consequences of 
their actions. In this day and age, when the best and brightest in government, aca-
demia, and business have led the nation into diffi  cult times, it is just such ability 
that seems to be absent. Educators, then, must look to the development not only 
of knowledge, skill, and understanding, but also of judgment and even wisdom. 
Th ey must look for evaluative learning, for educative experiences. Only in doing 
this can Dewey’s hopes for the role of schools in society be fulfi lled, perhaps im-
proving both in the process.
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